Stress-Testing the Consensus: What If Removing Ben-Gvir Doesn't Change Anything?

The conventional wisdom on the Israeli election — shared by Trump aides, most Western diplomatic observers, and the analytical community — holds that a Netanyahu government excluding Ben-Gvir and Smotrich would be broadly positive for U.S.-Israel relations and regional stability. That consensus deserves scrutiny.

The first assumption to challenge is that Ben-Gvir and Smotrich are the primary obstacle to diplomatic progress. The core disputes in Israeli-Palestinian relations — final status of Jerusalem, borders, settlements, right of return — predate both politicians and have resisted resolution under governments that excluded them. The Oslo process failed under Rabin. Camp David failed under Barak. The Trump plan failed to secure Palestinian buy-in regardless of Israeli coalition composition. The causal claim that removing two far-right ministers unlocks diplomatic progress may overstate their specific role in blocking outcomes that have eluded resolution for decades.

The second assumption worth questioning is that a Netanyahu loss necessarily produces a more stable government. The opposition bloc at 48 seats is not dramatically more viable than Netanyahu's 56 when 61 is the threshold. An Eisenkot-led government would still depend on small parties with their own conditions, would operate in a deeply polarized political environment, and would inherit the same governance challenges — active military operations, hostage negotiations, an economy under stress, and a fractured society — that defined the election as a referendum on Netanyahu in the first place.

The third assumption concerns the coherence of Trump's stated preference. Trump has a documented history of rapidly revising his positions on foreign leaders. The Axios reporting captures what aides believe at a specific moment; aides' views and Trump's actual decisions have a complicated relationship. Two indicators would test the conventional analysis over the coming months: first, whether U.S.-Israel diplomacy on the big files — Saudi normalization, Gaza governance, West Bank settlement activity — meaningfully accelerates if a government excluding Ben-Gvir forms; and second, whether Ben-Gvir himself becomes a more powerful opposition figure if excluded, potentially with a larger base in the next electoral cycle, having positioned himself as a martyr to American pressure. Israeli coalition politics is famously unpredictable. The negotiations that follow the vote will reveal more than the vote itself.